Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (X) — by Nagarjuna

X.1. If fire is identical to its kindling, then it is both producer and product.
And if fire is different from kindling, then surely fire exists without kindling.

X.2. A fire which is perpetually burning would exist without a cause, which is kindling,
Since another beginning would be pointless; in this case fire is without its object i.e., burning of kindling.

X.3. Fire is without a cause, namely kindling, if it were independent of anything else;
In which case another beginning would be pointless, and there is perpetual burning.

X.4. If it is maintained: Kindling is that which is being kindled,
By what is kindling kindled, since kindling is only that kindling?
It is inherent existence that would make extinguishing /liberation impossible

X.5. Fire, when different and not obtained through kindling, will not obtain; not burning, it will not burn later;
Without extinction, it will not be extinguished; if there is no extinction, then it will remain with its own characteristics.

X.6. The opponent claims:
If fire is different from kindling it could obtain the kindling
As a woman obtains a husband, and a man obtains a wife.

X.7. Nargarjuna answers:
Though fire is different from kindling, it could indeed obtain the kindling,
On the condition that both fire and kindling can be reciprocally differentiated —but, this is impossible.

X.8. If the fire is dependent on the kindling, and if the kindling is dependent on the fire
Which is attained first, dependent on which they are fire and kindling?

X.9. If fire is dependent on kindling, so is the proof of the proved fire.
Thus, being kindling it will exist without fire.

X.10. When a thing (bhava) is proved by being dependent on something else, then it proves the other by being dependent on it.
If that which is required for dependence must be proved, then what is dependent on what?

X.11. If that thing is proved by being dependent, how can that which has not been proved be dependent?
So, that which is proved is dependent; but the dependence is not possible.

X.12. Fire does not exist in relation to kindling; and fire does not exist unrelated to kindling.
Kindling does not exist in relation to fire; and kindling does not exist unrelated to fire.

X.13. Fire does not come from something else;
and fire does not exist in kindling.
The remaining analysis in regard to kindling is described by the analysis of “that which is being gone to,” “that which is gone to” and ”that which is not yet gone to.”

X.14. Fire is not identical to kindling, but fire is not in anything other than kindling.
Fire does not have kindling as its property; also, the kindling is not in fire and vice versa.

X.15. By the analysis of fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self (atma) and “the acquiring” (upadana)
Is fully and completely explained, as well as “the jar” and “the cloth” and other analogies.

X.16. Those who specify the nature of the individual self and of existing things (bhava) as radically different—
Those people I do not regard as ones who know the sense of the teaching.

Source: Orientalia